If N.Korean strategy is so effective, why not let Japan adopt it?

Masashi MURANO‏
@show_murano

北朝鮮のミサイル問題について米専門家の客観的な分析が聞きたい人・メディアは、下手に専門外の大物政治学者や国務省OBに聞くより、この２人にインタビューしたらいいと思います。https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/want-to-avoid-nuclear-war-reject-mutual-vulnerability-with-north-korea/ … @warontherocksさんから

6:38 - 2017年8月29日



WANT TO AVOID NUCLEAR WAR? REJECT MUTUAL VULNERABILITY WITH NORTH KOREA
VINCE A. MANZO AND JOHN K. WARDENAUGUST 29, 2017

By seeking to reduce vulnerability to a North Korean nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland, the United States has placed North Korea in a different category than Russia. (Where China should fit is a matter of debate.) Washington accepts that “mutual vulnerability” to nuclear attack is an enduring reality of its relationship with Moscow. In other words, the United States assesses that neither it nor Russia has the ability to disarm a considerable portion of the other’s nuclear weapons capability and prevent a significant retaliatory strike.



Part of the reason the United States has accepted mutual vulnerability with Russia is that it wants to avoid first-strike instability. The traditional concept of first-strike instability reasons that a nuclear-armed country would have a strong incentive to launch a first strike against its nuclear-armed adversary in a crisis if, first, doing so would enable it to generate an advantage by destroying a significant portion of its adversary’s nuclear forces and, second, its adversary also has an incentive to strike first and limit damage before its own forces are degraded or destroyed. In other words, nuclear deterrence could fail in a crisis if one or both sides were to perceive that both the potential payoff of attacking and the risk of delaying or restraining are high.


Importantly, the use-them-or-lose-them logic of classical first-strike instability does not apply to the U.S.-North Korea nuclear relationship. In a crisis or conflict, North Korea would certainly fear for the survivability of its nuclear forces and potentially its regime. But even once North Korea’s nuclear force grows larger and more sophisticated, Pyongyang could not conceivably hope to generate an advantage by conducting a damage-limiting nuclear first strike against the United States. Such a strike would not significantly degrade U.S. nuclear forces or overall war potential and would ensure the end of the Kim regime.

How then, could the United States fail to deter North Korean nuclear use? Pyongyang knows that it cannot use nuclear weapons and other capabilities to defeat U.S. and allied military forces. Instead, Kim Jong Un’s more plausible theory of victory is a strategy that attempts to use nuclear coercion to persuade the United States that the costs and risks of overthrowing the Kim regime are too high. In this sense, North Korea’s initial attempt at asymmetric escalation using nuclear weapons is more likely to be a limited strike against regional military targets than a massive strike against the continental United States. Pyongyang would attempt to degrade the ability of the U.S. to flow forces to the Korean Peninsula, while demonstrating a propensity for controlled risk-taking. But critically, North Korea would retain a survivable reserve nuclear force to threaten destruction of major U.S. population centers if the United States does not back down.


If Kim Jong Un is confident that North Korea can maintain a survivable reserve force that can threaten U.S. cities, he may be tempted to use nuclear weapons in a limited, coercive fashion to try to terminate a conventional conflict with the United States and its allies. Rather than use-or-lose, the logic driving North Korean first use would be, use some because you will not lose the rest. Even more unsettling, if Pyongyang became confident in its ability to use nuclear coercion as a war termination mechanism, it might conclude that it has leeway to initiate violent provocations and even war.


Thus, rather than accepting North Korea’s ability to cause significant destruction to the United States with a nuclear strike, the United States should field damage limitation capabilities, a combination of strike and missile defense armaments that would allow the United States to disarm the majority of North Korea’s nuclear weapons capability and prevent significant retaliatory strikes against U.S. cities.


To counter the threat of regional nuclear strikes, the United States, South Korea, and Japan should improve their ability to strike and defend against North Korea’s theater-range missiles. In truth, North Korea may see nuclear coercion targeting Japan or South Korea as a more likely path to terminating a war than directly threatening the United States.

　ロシアは、核兵器で、米国の核兵器をほぼ全滅させる能力をもっているから、いざ、一戦交えるとなったら、最初に米国にドカッとやってくる。そうしないと、ロシアがアメリカに同じことをされるからである。

　しかし、北朝鮮はそれだけの能力はない。

　したがって、やるとしたら、半島に投げれ込んでくる拠点となる米軍基地をたたく一方、米本土の都市を標的にした核兵器は温存して、米国の譲歩を迫るだろう、と。さらに、米国の都市を核兵器で脅せるとわかれば、北朝鮮は、暴力的な挑発や戦争さえも弄ぶ余裕ができることになる。

　そこで、米国としては、北朝鮮を核武装解除させる攻撃力と、北朝鮮からの核攻撃から身を守る防衛能力を身につける必要がある、と。

　また、北朝鮮としては、アメリカを脅すよりも、日本や韓国に核爆弾落として、戦争を終結させる駆け引き材料にする危険があるので、当該地域周辺の攻撃能力と防衛能力を北朝鮮の軍事力に応じて適切に高めておく必要がある、と。


ーーーなんだかなあ、これじゃ心許ないなあ。


１）北朝鮮も全米の核施設を標的にできる軍事増強へと進まないとは限らない。その意味では時間稼ぎ。

２）米国本土を狙う対ICBM防衛は技術的に困難、と言われている。

３）とすれば、米国が米国の都市を犠牲にする賭けにでて、東京やソウルを守るか、という疑念はのこる。

いずれにせよ、北朝鮮の戦略は、かなり効率的で優れているわけだろうーー核兵器つきのICBMってすごいんですね。

日本としては、冒険主義の北朝鮮に対して、日本を攻撃したら金政権が壊滅するリスクは高いよ、ということを示せる戦略をとらないと駄目やな。まあ、膨張主義の中国に対してもそうだけど。

日本が見習うべき戦略的なお手本を誰かが示してくれているような気がしないでもないが・・・・